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1. Introduction: Skills and Politics 
 
Somewhere during the early years of the Chinese Warring States period (453-221 BC), 
Gongshu Ban (ca. 507-444 BC), the legendary carpenter and engineer from the state of Lu, 
presented his just completed magpie-kite to the philosopher Mozi (ca. 480-390 BC). Carved 
from bamboo and wood, the kite could stay up in the air for three days in a row. Gongshu was 
confident that he would meet with nothing but praise, since his invention required an unprece-
dented mastery of both aerodynamics and craftsmanship. How surprised he must have been to 
be confronted with Mozi’s strong disapproval: even a tiny stick of wood, three inches long and 
swiftly chopped by a regular carpenter, was judged by Mozi to be worthier than Gongshu’s kite. 
The first could serve as a cartwheel’s lynchpin, withstanding the weight of 5000 liters of cargo, 
whereas the latter was probably nothing more than an amusing children’s toy. “Therefore,” 
Mozi concludes, “of all things regarded as achievements, that which benefits people I call skill-
ful; that which does not benefit people I call clumsy.”1 Gongshu’s achievement did not deserve 
the predicate “skillful” (qiao巧), since he had overlooked a crucial factor: benefit (li 利). As 
Mozi states elsewhere: “Even though you might possess skillful craftsmanship, you are not 
necessarily able to get things right.”2 How to “get things right” (de zheng 得正) is one of the 
central questions of Mozi’s epistemology, and it has important political implications.3 
Right after Mozi’s evaluation of Gongshu’s magpie-kite, a politically charged discus-
sion follows, in which Gongshu recalls how he had once designed a “cloud-ladder” for the king 
of Chu, who wished to use it to attack the state of Song, until Mozi dissuaded him from doing 
so.4 According to Mozi, righteousness (yi 義), a term closely related to benefit,5 and not tech-
nological skill alone, should be the primary factor in considering one’s political ambitions: 
 
                                                 
1 Mozi 49.21, 724. In this paper, all translations from the Mozi are my own, based on Wu Yujiang’s edition (2006). 
I am indebted to Ian Johnston’s translation (2010 and 2014), but I do not always follow his interpretations and 
terminology. When citing the Mozi, I refer to the paragraph numbers as given in Johnston’s translation, as well as 
the corresponding page numbers of Wu’s edition.  
2 Mozi 36.1, 406. 
3 The word zheng 正, “right”, means “to rectify” as a verb, and is closely related to the Classical Chinese term for 
politics or government (zheng 政). 
4 See Mozi 50.1-7, 747-8. Folklore has it that the magpie-kite also served a military function, as Joseph Needham 
(1994, p. 278) writes: “One tradition even goes so far as to say that Gongshu [Ban] flew wooden man-lifting kites 
over the city of Song during a siege, either for observation or as vantage-points for archers.” The Mozi says nothing 
of this use of the kite.  
5 Mozi, A8.C, 461: “righteous is that which benefits”. 
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Master Gongshu said to Master Mozi: “When I had not yet had the chance to meet you, I wished 
to take Song, but now that I have met you, I would not do it if it was not righteous, even if Song 
was given to me.  
“When I had not yet met you,” Master Mozi replied, “you wished to take Song, but now 
that I have met you, you would not do it if it was not righteous, even if Song was given to you. 
This is me giving Song to you. If you take righteousness as your duty, I can even give the world 
to you.”6 
 
At this point, Mozi has apparently taught Gongshu to regard righteousness as the fundamental 
principle of his work: although Gongshu might have nothing to learn from Mozi when it comes 
to practical craftmanship, Mozi provides him with the skills needed in applying his knowledge 
in the sphere of politics, where righteousness is the basic principle of government policy.7 He 
may thereby come to possess the entire world, and this concluding statement should probably 
be understood symbolically: Mozi’s teachings are universal, not attached to any individual ruler 
or state. As a skillful and righteous engineer, Gongshu no longer needs to serve the particular 
interests of the king of Chu, but may aspire to a political career spanning the entire Chinese 
world, devoting himself to the universal values Mozi has taught him.8  
Gongshu Ban was only one of Mozi’s political protégés: in the Mozi, the text attributed 
to Mozi, we encounter many more instances of the master recommending his disciples for of-
fices in various states, always under the condition that they never lose righteousness out of 
sight.9 In this paper, I will interpret Mozi’s philosophy from the perspective of his role as a 
teacher and advisor for potential government officials. As Yi-pao Mei has also observed, one 
of the key aims of Mozi’s philosophy “is to supply governments with political experts.”10 The 
                                                 
6 Mozi 49.21, 724. 
7 Mozi 26.3, 288: “Righteousness is what it means to govern [or: to rectify]”. There is no agreement on the trans-
lation of the term yi, as its semantic field is too broad to be captured in any English phrase. In this paper, I will 
stick to “righteousness”, keeping in mind that it is the fundamental principle of Mozi’s philosophy. 
8 The accounts of Mozi and Gongshu Ban are almost certainly fictitious. While Mozi is commonly said to have 
lived between ca. 480 and 390 BC (see Tan 1995, pp. 4-5 for an overview of the differing opinions. I will comment 
upon the complexities of the historical Mozi and the Mozi in the next chapter), less agreement exists on the histor-
ical Gongshu Ban. Only Ren Jiyu (1998, pp. 11-12) holds that he was of the same age and from the same town as 
Mozi. Despite their lack of historical substance, however, I would argue that the stories convey an important phil-
osophical meaning, bringing together the practically-minded craftsman and the teacher of ethical values. See Sun 
2009 for a similar approach. 
9 In Mozi, 46.13, 644, Mozi praises one of his disciples to have refused office in a state fundamentally opposed to 
yi, even though he was granted an enormous salary. For other instances of Mozi paving ways for his disciples’ 
careers: 46.5, 642; 47.15, 673; 48.16, 693; 48.24, 697; 49.13, 721 (the entire chapter 49 is devoted to Mozi per-
suading rulers, specifically Lord Wen of Luyang). 
10 Mei 1934, p. 45. 
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notion of a political expert presupposes an idea of meritocracy, which indeed lies at the heart 
of Mozi’s political philosophy. It also hints at the strong practical import of Mozi’s epistemol-
ogy, in which the term “usefulness” (yong 用) plays a key role in evaluating an idea’s accuracy. 
Mozi’s philosophy could thus be characterized as an attempt to connect power to knowledge, 
and to ensure that the knowledgeable ones fill the ranks of government. Many academic studies 
discuss Mozi’s epistemology in relation to his ethical statements, while paying less attention to 
the political institutions envisioned by Mozi.11 In understanding Mozi as a teacher and recruiter 
of government officials, my aim is to lay bear the strong political dimension of Mozi’s philos-
ophy: Mozi seeks to challenge the dominant aristocratic institutions of his time and to replace 
them with a meritocratic bureaucracy. Although Mozi does not explicitly formulate this politi-
cal program, it can be reconstructed through a comprehensive reading of his political philoso-
phy and epistemology, which is the aim of this paper. 
The basic question of this paper concerns the relation between Mozi’s political philos-
ophy and his epistemology: what kind of political system does Mozi envision in order to im-
plement his meritocratic ideas, and by what standards must knowledge be judged to be politi-
cally useful? Moreover, what is Mozi’s conception of political order and how does it relate to 
his conception of valid knowledge?  
The main body of this paper is divided into two parts: the first part argues how Mozi’s 
meritocratic ideas are embedded within his narrative of the origins of politics from the state of 
nature. The second part discusses Mozi’s epistemology, and aims to disclose how his doctrine 
of the three standards for knowledge is designed to ensure the sustainment of Mozi’s ideal 
bureaucracy, while his theory of proper distinctions is meant to demarcate social and hierar-
chical boundaries. Before that, however, I will make a few remarks concerning the text of the 
Mozi, as well as the historical framework within which I propose to understand the figure Mozi. 
  
                                                 
11 See for instance Loy 2008, who speaks of Mozi’s “moral epistemology”, identifying Mozi’s conception of a 
“sound doctrine” with “right conduct”. If I were to borrow his framework, I would use the phrase “political epis-
temology” and replace “right conduct” with “legitimate institution”. Another important example of Mozi’s episte-
mology tied to ethics is the lively debate on the question whether Mozi’s ethical theory is based on a form of 
utilitarianism or a divine command theory. See Johnson 2011 for an overview of this debate, as well as an attempt 
to resolve it. I should emphasize that by shifting the focus from ethics to politics, I do not intend to disregard these 
debates, but rather to add a different dimension to them.  
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2. Mozi and the Mozi 
 
2.1 Mozi as a Political Teacher and Persuader 
 
When reading the ancient Chinese philosophers, one has to take heed of the uncertainties sur-
rounding the texts that tradition has attributed to the “masters and schools” of the Warring States 
period. The mainstream narrative of philosophical activity as organized in different “schools”, 
founded by the identifiable authors of their main texts, has been exposed to be probably a con-
struct from Han dynasty times (206 BC-220 AD).12 Before that, unfixed texts circulated among 
groups of “master persuaders” and their disciples, who were not primarily associated with a 
text, but rather with a certain approach to politics, “expressed by a motto or a form of special 
practice.”13 From a philosophical point of view, one can of course choose to circumvent these 
issues by taking the texts as ahistorical, meaningful entities in themselves, discussing them from 
the perspective of a symbolically implied author. However, since I set forth to treat Mozi as a 
political figure, and thereby as the product of the political circumstances of his time, I should 
briefly address the historical context which renders such an understanding plausible.14  
Towards the Warring States period, the slow disruption of the old hereditary institutions 
of the Zhou dynasty (1045-221 BC) gave rise to the increasing power of individual rulers in the 
various states. The extension of their governments opened up new career-possibilities for the 
class of intellectuals (shi 士), who found themselves out of office despite their ambitions and 
social status.15 The historian Cho-yun Hsu lays much emphasis on this development, as he de-
scribes the idea of a meritocratic bureaucracy, with a hereditary ruler who relegates all tasks of 
                                                 
12Csikszentmihalyi & Nylan 2003; Smith 2003. 
13 Csikszentmihalyi & Nylan 2003, p. 63. William Boltz (2005) argues that the finally transmitted texts are the 
result of later editors compiling earlier fragments and mottos, which served as “building blocks”. Erik Maeder 
(1992, pp. 81-2) argues that the Mozi too is a product of such “bricoleurs”, while Carine Defoort (2014 and 2016) 
attempts to understand Mozi’s philosophy through such mottos and “fixed formulations”, constituting different 
historical layers in the Mozi (see footnote 25). 
14 Here I should emphasize that in understanding Mozi in a historical context, I do not seek to speculate about the 
actual, historical Mozi. Mozi as the presumed author of the Mozi remains at all times a symbolic construct, which, 
I maintain, could nonetheless be understood within a historical framework. 
15 Lewis 1999, p. 604. The shi originally consisted “of the educated sons of the nobility and the most able and 
talented of the commoners” (Hsu 1965, p. 89). Mark Lewis translates the word as “man of service”, echoing 
Charles Hucker’s “serviceman” (1985, p. 421). In this discussion, I borrow the translation “intellectual” from Yuri 
Pines (2009, p. 117), who uses it to refer to “the intellectually active shi”, which does not necessarily capture the 
entire social stratum, but is accurate within a political context. According to Pines (2013, p. 166), the philosophical 
“masters” (zi子), to whom Mozi belonged, were those shi who established themselves as “intellectual and moral 
leaders of the society.” 
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policy-making to capable officials, as one of the primary engines for social mobility in this 
period.16 Being recognized as capable officials thus became an important motive for intellectu-
als to study the principles of governing, leading them to form self-conscious peer-groups and 
affiliate themselves with independent teachers like Mozi.17 We could thus describe Mozi’s phil-
osophical attempt to connect knowledge to power as a way of persuading rulers to employ 
capable intellectuals.  
In emphasizing Mozi’s role as a political teacher and persuader, my approach slightly 
differs from Chris Fraser’s recent introductory account, in which he presents Mozi as a public 
activist, personally concerned with the social chaos of his time, whose philosophy “was above 
all a social and political program aimed at overcoming war, strife, crime, and poverty.”18 Alt-
hough certainly not untrue, the focus on Mozi’s philosophy as motivated from sincere concerns 
with suffering does not immediately explain the practical ramifications of Mozi’s role as a per-
suader for rulers and recruiter of officials.19 Therefore, I hope to show in this paper that Mozi’s 
philosophy is not only a coherent body of thought, but also a political program in service of the 
recruitment of talented government personnel.  
This program demanded a radical promotion of meritocracy, directed at those rulers who 
tended to hold on to the old system of hereditary offices. As Yuri Pines points out, the Springs 
and Autumns period (770-453 BC) “was the golden age of hereditary aristocracy”, when a sys-
tem of hereditary offices “effectively precluded outsiders from entering the top echelon of pow-
erholders.”20 The breakdown of the Zhou-institutions, culminating in the Warring States period, 
                                                 
16 Hsu 1965, pp. 86-92. 
17 Ibid., p. 150. See also Pines 2013, p. 170: “Many – probably most – shi were primarily interested in a government 
career as a means of improving their economic status, and Mozi was a keen speaker on their behalf.” Furthermore, 
Mozi explicitly confirms his independent status as a teacher: “Above, I have no ruler to serve; below, I do not have 
the burdens of farming, so how could I dare to discard [studying and teaching]?” (Mozi, 47.13, 673). 
18 Fraser 2016, p. 5. An extremer view of this approach is the study by Scott Lowe (1992), who terms Mozi’s 
project a primarily religious one, defining “religious concern” as “that which the text, person, or group in question 
feels is of ultimate importance and worthy of ultimate allegiance” (p. 3). According to Lowe, Mozi was exclusively 
concerned with the promotion of the highest benefit for the largest possible amount of people (the utilitarian point 
of view). While this could be true, I do not deem it fruitful to use the term ‘religion’ in this sense, as it may distract 
from Mozi’s functionalist political perspective. The term religion could better be reserved for some of the practices 
promoted as parts of his political project (such as venerating the gods and observing sacrifices), rather than iden-
tifying it as Mozi’s primary concern. 
19 Dan Robins (2008) has convincingly argued for an understanding of Mozi as a political persuader, rather than a 
theoretical philosopher. My approach elaborates on his views, as I propose to combine a coherent reading of Mozi’s 
philosophy with an understanding of his political role. However, I will try to avoid a too cynical - even Machia-
vellistic - view of Mozi, like the one suggested by Wong & Loy (2013). Their reading of Mozi’s arguments - 
specifically his anti-rational adherence to ghosts and spirits - as a possible handbook for manipulative rulers tends 
to put too much emphasis on Mozi as a ruthless persuader.  
20 Pines 2013, p. 162.  
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made it possible for meritocratic ideas to take root, and Mozi was one of their first explicit 
supporters.21 Before Mozi’s lifetime, it was perceived as natural that the noble (gui貴), those 
belonging to the aristocratic families, were governing the base (jian賤), the poor commoners. 
Mozi formulated two additional conditions for political order: the noble should be those who 
are wise (zhi 智), whereas the base should be those who are foolish (yu 愚). Only when the 
noble and the wise are made to govern the foolish and the base, an orderly government can be 
established.22 This implied that in theory, even common fishermen or farmers could now enter 
the stratum of nobility, should they prove to be wise enough, while the foolish of noble descent 
could always lose their social prominence.23 This synthesis of wisdom and meritocracy, of 
knowledge and power, functions as the theoretical foundation of Mozi’s political program. 
 
2.2 The Text of the Mozi 
 
This paper focuses on the so-called “core chapters” and the dialogues of the Mozi.24 The core 
chapters formulate ten main doctrines of Mozi’s philosophy, each divided into three separate 
essays, albeit some of them are lost. 25 The basic principles of Mozi’s political philosophy are 
developed in the first two triplets, while his epistemology is found in the last. In between, spe-
cific policy issues are discussed, such as the rejection of aggressive warfare and elaborate fu-
nerals, as well as the affirmation of the “will of Heaven” and the existence of gods and ghosts. 
                                                 
21 Pines 2013, pp. 169-71. Elsewhere (2009, p. 122), Pines observes that Mozi’s promotion of meritocracy went 
with remarkably little opposition, which indicates that rulers already considered the empowerment of intellectuals 
as inevitable.  
22 Mozi, 9.1, 73. 
23 See Mozi, 8.6, 66-7; 9.8, 77. 
24 The other sections of the Mozi are less relevant for my subject: two of them are devoted to technical discussions 
of logics, and one of them deals with strategies for defensive warfare. The first section of the Mozi is philosophi-
cally more interesting: it is formed by seven short essays, most probably from a later date than the core chapters 
(Durrant 1975, p. 15), and introduces seven main themes of Mohist philosophy in a concise style. However, its 
authenticity is uncertain, and it does not shed much further light on Mozi’s philosophy. For some clear overviews 
of the textual history of the Mozi, see Durrant 1975, pp. 45-90 and Lowe 1992, pp. 50-73. 
25 Recent scholarship by Carine Defoort (2015 and 2016) has revealed that the portrayal of Mozi’s philosophy as 
consisting of “ten core doctrines” is largely the product of nineteenth century philology, most notably by Sun 
Yirang (1978/1895). She argues that the text of the Mozi reflects a gradual evolution of the thinking of the historical 
Mozi, his followers and later (Han dynasty) editors, rather than a consciously developed set of ten core ideas. See 
also Defoort & Standaert 2013, introduction.  
Regarding the threefold composition, A.C. Graham (1985) identifies three separate layers within the core 
chapters, which, however, do not exactly overlap with the current arrangement of the text. Graham (p. 20) attributes 
the threefold structure to three sects of “Mohism”, addressing three different audiences (government officials, 
fellow philosophers and rulers of the more conservative southern states). Karen Desmet (2006) argues that the 
threefold structure is the result of a historical evolution, rather than sectarian division. 
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Although I will mainly discuss the first and the last triplet, I will refer to the other chapters 
whenever relevant. 
 Apart from the core chapters, I will cite from the dialogue-section, which offers some 
interesting concretizations of the rather abstract doctrines of the core chapters.26 The dialogues 
are my main source in presenting Mozi as a political persuader, as we witness Mozi advising 
rulers on policy issues, recommending disciples for offices and giving explicit motivations for 
his work as an intellectual. In invoking the dialogues, I elaborate on Fraser’s insight that the 
dialogues can be read as clarifying Mozi’s primary philosophical principle, righteousness, while 
at the same time showing how Mozi’s words (yan 言) can be put into practice (xing 行), by 
placing Mozi’s teachings into real-life situations, including considerations of intentions, moti-
vations and conflicts with practical reality.27 Such considerations are generally lacking in the 
core chapters. 
  
                                                 
26 Based on grammatical analysis, Stephan Durrant concludes that the dialogue-section is mostly from a later date 
than the core chapters, but is possibly written at the same time as the latest stratum of the core chapters: “It is the 
writer’s feeling that the Dialogue Chapters reflect the eclectic language of the later Zhou period, while the Essay 
Chapters are written in a highly colloquial language of a slightly earlier period.” (Durrant 1975, p. 306). 
27 Fraser 2013. 
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3. The Foundations of Power: Political Philosophy 
 
Mozi’s political philosophy is developed in the first two triplets of the core chapters: the three 
chapters entitled Esteeming Worthiness (Shang xian 尚賢) discuss a set of principles which 
could be characterized as meritocratic, according to which only capable officials should be em-
ployed, dismissing all other possible criteria. The next three chapters, entitled Esteeming Unity 
(Shang tong 尚同) describe Mozi’s ideal bureaucracy in its hypothetical historical development, 
a narrative of early humans escaping the chaotic state of nature by forming a network of hier-
archic positions with corresponding responsibilities, all based on a universal agreement upon 
the principle of righteousness. Taken together, these chapters present us with a political system 
that Mozi deemed perfectly fit for relegating all positions of power to those possessing the right 
knowledge and skills to attain the three basic aims of all governments: material wealth, popu-
lation growth and social order. In general, Mozi’s political thinking is marked by its detachment 
from historical time: there is no ideal past to be restored, but only ideal principles to constantly 
strive towards. 
 
3.1 The Sage Kings and the Three Aims of Government 
 
Mozi envisions mankind’s transition from the state of nature into a political system through the 
guidance of the ancient sage kings (sheng wang 聖王), who by means of their technological 
skills freed their people from the merciless forces of nature. His primary example is Yu, the 
legendary tamer of the floods and founder of the equally legendary Xia dynasty (ca. 2070-1600 
BC). Mozi thereby explicitly takes his loyalty away from the Zhou dynasty, whose cultural 
institutions were deeply admired by Confucius (551-478 BC) and his followers. Mozi prefers 
practical skill over cultural refinement, as Benjamin Schwartz notes: “The fact that he obviously 
genuinely prefers civilization in its simple unadorned state suggests that there was nothing 
wildly implausible from his point of view in believing that the Xia had been closer to his ideal 
than the Zhou.”28 
                                                 
28 Schwartz 1985, p. 156 (transcription adjusted). Another important reference in this regard is a biographical note 
in the Huainanzi, a Han Dynasty anthology: “Mozi studied the works of the Confucian scholars, and received 
instructions regarding the methods of Confucius. Considering their ritual codes loathsome and worrisome, he did 
not delight in them. The extravagant burials were a waste of resources and impoverished the people, harming their 
lives and making matters worse. He thereupon turned his back on the way of the Zhou and followed the governance 
of the Xia (Huainanzi 11.25, in He 1998). 
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The heroic deeds of Yu are recounted in the context of an argument for the practicability 
of Mozi’s universal ethical ideals, summing up the sage kings’ contributions to the people’s 
well-being:  
 
In ancient times, Yu brought order to the world. In the west, he created the Western River and 
the Fisherman’s Stream in order to divert the waters of Ju, Sun and Huang. In the north, he 
created the Fang, Quan and Gu, leading the floods into the streams of Houzhidi and Huchi. He 
made the Dizhu spring forth, tunneled through the Dragon’s Gate, in order to benefit the people 
around Yandai, Hutuo and the Western River. In the east, he lifted a hill in defense against the 
Mengzhu-marshes, and divided the Nine Channels to block the waters of the Eastern Plains, 
thereby benefiting the people of Jizhou. In the south, he created the Yellow River, the Han, Huai 
and Ru, making them stream eastwards, flooding into the region of the Five Lakes, benefiting 
the people of Jing, Chu, Gan, Yue and the Southern Barbarians. This is told about Yu’s deeds, 
and this is how we can practice universality today.29  
 
The last line is especially informing, as it underlines Mozi’s interest in undertaking such ambi-
tious engineering projects in his own time. In general, then, insofar as Mozi refers to ancient 
times, he emphasizes the practical accomplishments of the sage kings, rather than appealing to 
a utopian vision of the past.  
This distrust of utopianism is concisely summed up in a debate with Gongmeng Zi, a 
supposed follower of Confucius, who argues for the uncritical adherence to “ancient speech and 
attire”. Mozi provides him with firm reply, stating that the ideal principle of humaneness (ren
仁) does not depend on a particular institution, but only on its realization in actual achievements, 
as was the case with the Xia dynasty:  
 
In ancient times, King Zhòu of Shang30 and his prime minister Fei Zhong were tyrants in the 
world, while Viscount Ji and Viscount Wei were sages. Their speech was the same but the latter 
two were humane, while the first were not. Duke Dan of Zhou31 was the most sagely man in the 
world, while [his adversary] Guan Shu was the most tyrannical man. Their attire was the same, 
                                                 
29 Mozi, 15.8, 157. 
30 The Shang dynasty (ca. 1600-1045 BC) was the successor of the Xia and preceded the Zhou. King Zhòu (not to 
be confused with the dynasty-name Zhou) was the Shang’s “evil last ruler”. It is the earliest dynasty to be histori-
cally attested by archeological evidence (see Keightley 1999). 
31 The Duke of Zhou (11th century BC) is the cultural hero of Confucius, responsible for the ceremonial institutions 
of the Zhou dynasty. By praising him nonetheless, Mozi shows that he does not entirely reject the Zhou dynasty, 
but rather the Confucians’ elevation of it as a utopian standard. 
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but the one was humane while the other was not. Therefore: [to be humane] does not depend on 
ancient speech or attire. Moreover, you take Zhou as your model, instead of Xia, so what you 
call “ancient” is not even really ancient!32 
 
Mozi’s message is that while the Zhou dynasty may have brought forth some virtuous people, 
this does not mean that the dynasty as such may serve as the only true model of virtuous behav-
ior. Whereas, should Gongmeng Zi really insist on referring to an ancient model, he had better 
resort to a truly ancient dynasty, which could at least be remembered for its beneficial achieve-
ments, rather than wasteful ceremonial extravagance. This then is the starting point of Mozi’s 
narrative of the origins of politics: the aims of government should be measured against the 
perceptible achievements of skillful politicians, rather than the idealized patterns of ancient 
ceremony.  
 These aims of government are threefold, and according to Mozi, any inquiry of the prin-
ciples of politics ultimately boils down to asking how and why governments, now and in the 
past, have failed to realize these three aims: 
 
In ancient times, when kings, dukes and high officers developed policies for their states, they 
all wished their states to be wealthy, their populations to be numerous, and their governments 
to be orderly. However, instead of wealth, they obtained poverty; instead of population growth, 
they obtained shrinkage; and instead of order they obtained disorder. Therefore, they basically 
lost what they wished for, and obtained what they despised. What is the reason of it? Master 
Mozi says: It is because when kings, dukes and high officers develop policies for their states, 
they do not know how to base their government on esteeming the worthy and employing the 
capable.33 
 
The three aims of government – wealth, population growth and order - are frequently formu-
lated by Mozi, and it is no coincidence that they also form the first line of the chapters on 
                                                 
32 Mozi, 48.4, 689. 
33 Mozi, 8.1-2, 65. This quotation’s first character, “ancient times” (gu 古) has puzzled many scholars, as they 
tended to read the Mozi within the more Confucian framework of an ideal past and a degenerated present, so how 
could ancient kings have failed to live up to their standards? This puzzlement led Sun Yirang to a philologically 
unjustified replacement of gu with jin 今, “present times” (Sun 1978/1895, p. 42), which is followed by Johnston 
in his translation. However, I take Mozi’s reference to “ancient times” as highly significant here, as it shows how 
Mozi was not thinking along the lines of an ideal past, but argues that bad governments, just like good ones, have 
always existed – with the rare exceptions of the virtuous deeds of the sage kings – and are thus independent of 
time.  
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epistemology, as the three aims are the basic motivation for studying any philosophical prob-
lem.34 Moreover, the chapters on economic frugality (jie yong 節用) and moderation in funerals 
(jie zang節葬) are devoted to a discussion of how wasteful extravagance and elaborate funerals 
frustrate the fulfillment of precisely these three aims. With elaborate funerals, workmen are 
distracted from their duties, which disturbs the economy and brings about poverty. The harsh 
regulations for mourning are unhealthy and discourage men and women from procreating, 
which brings about population shrinkage. Finally, government officials and family members 
neglect their proper roles, breeding social disorder.35  
When a Confucian opponent defends that the ancient sage kings nevertheless prescribed 
elaborate funerals, Mozi replies that this could not have been the case, as, just like Yu taming 
the floods, the sage kings’ achievements lie in their focus on practical benefit, which must be 
measured independently of their historical context. So, even though the sage kings accom-
plished an enormous amount of wealth in their states, their burials and mourning regulations 
must have been a paragon of frugality: 
 
If we look at it from the perspective of the three sage kings, it cannot be the case that elaborate 
funerals and prolonged mourning-rites were the way of the sage kings. Still, they were granted 
the title Son of Heaven and their wealth spanned the entire world, so how could they have wor-
ried that their material expenses were insufficient? They simply considered [frugality] the best 
method for funerals.36 
 
In short, Mozi only refers to the rulers of the past where they can be shown to have 
governed in line with the three aims of government. As exemplary politicians, the sage kings 
fit into Mozi’s philosophical narrative of how the political world came into being, as a way to 
free human beings from their lives in the state of nature, the story to which I will now turn.  
 
3.2 From the State of Nature to the Political World 
 
In the early days of mankind, Mozi argues, people were fundamentally equal, and there were 
no political leaders to guide them. The lack of a political power-structure signifies two things: 
                                                 
34 Mozi, 35.1, 393. 
35 Mozi, 25.5-7, 259-60. 
36 Mozi, 25.11, 262. The “three sage kings” are the beforementioned Yu, along with his predecessors Yao and 
Shun. “Son of Heaven” (tianzi 天子) is the common title for the supreme ruler of the Chinese world, representing 
Heaven on earth. 
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disunity and beastliness. Without any moral authority around, the equality of people leads to 
the equality of moral principles. This conceptual equality implies social disharmony, with peo-
ple living the lives of wild beasts, each following their natural inclinations:  
 
In ancient times, when people first arose, there were not yet any regulations or governments. 
They must have said: “people differ in their [conception of] righteousness. Therefore: where 
there is one person, there is one [conception of] righteousness. Where there are two persons, 
there are two [conceptions of] righteousness. Where there are ten persons, there are ten [con-
ceptions of] righteousness.” The more people, the more [conceptions of] righteousness there 
must have been. That is the reason why people approved their own [conception of] righteousness, 
but rejected that of others. They thus mutually rejected each other.37 
 
This lack of agreement on the meaning of righteousness has the practical implication of disre-
specting family values on the one hand, and the unwillingness to economically cooperate on 
the other hand: 
 
Inside their houses, fathers and sons, and older and younger brothers, created distrust and enmity, 
which separated them, unable to live in harmony. The many clans of the world all harmed each 
other with water, fire and poisonous herbs, resulting in their inability to help each other with 
their surplus strengths. They hid and obscured the good way without teaching it to each other, 
left their surplus riches to rot and decay without sharing them with each other, and the chaos 
throughout the world reached the level of that among the wild beasts and the birds.38  
 
Therefore, salvation lies in reaching conceptual agreement, which coincides with the establish-
ment of hierarchical difference. In other words: the fundamental equality of people must be 
sacrificed in order to attain a unified conception of righteousness. 
At one point, people gained insight (ming 明) into the cause of the world’s disorder: the 
lack of political leadership. Therefore, “they selected the world’s most worthy, capable, wise, 
and knowledgeable man and established him as Son of Heaven, so that he may act and unify 
the world’s [conception of] righteousness.”39 We already see a meritocratic principle at work 
here: it is not a regular man who raises to power, but the wisest of all human beings. He himself 
does not lack modesty, as he “immediately realized that the senses of his eyes and ears were 
                                                 
37 Mozi, 11.1, 107. 
38 Mozi, 11.1, 107. 
39 Mozi, 12.2, 114. 
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insufficient to unify the world’s principles alone. He therefore selected the world’s most so-
phisticated and worthy men and established them as the Three Dukes, to follow his lead in 
unifying the world’s [conception of] righteousness.”40 This process repeats itself a number of 
times, all the way down to the level of the village chief, until the world is fully divided into 
different bureaucratic levels. Each layer is obliged to abide by the unified conception of right-
eousness, through a network of mutual responsibility in complying to the levels above, and 
controlling those below.41 In this way, Mozi unfolds the universal range of his political system: 
at its final accomplishment, the entire world is put under the authority of one hierarchically 
ordered government, until an empire is established which “fulfills all its plans, completes all its 
tasks, is strong in interior defense, and victorious in outer punitive wars.”42 The military phra-
seology here underlines the physical power underpinning this power-structure: inner rebellion 
is being guarded against, while those who fail to comply outside, be it peripheral barbarians or 
subversive elements, are punished. 
Regarding this transition from natural disorder to political order, three questions remain 
unanswered: Mozi does not tell us how this moment of understanding could emerge, it simply 
happens. Nor does he explain how people finally managed to agree upon whom to elevate to 
power. Finally, by what standard is the Son of Heaven able to form a legitimate definition of 
righteousness? Here, a supernatural intervention turns out to be the decisive factor, as becomes 
clear by relating two other triplets to Mozi’s state of nature-argument: the triplets entitled 
Heaven’s Will (Tian zhi 天志), and Rejecting Aggressive Warfare (Fei gong 非攻). In order to 
see their relevance, it is necessary to appreciate the metaphysical and mythological foundations 
of Mozi’s philosophical narrative. 
The notion of Heaven (tian 天) functions as the metaphysical foundation of Mozi’s po-
litical philosophy. Being the supreme cosmic power, there is no way to escape its authority: the 
son who commits a crime, may flee to another family; the official who offends his ruler, may 
flee to another state; but he who sins in the eyes of Heaven has nowhere to escape to, since 
“there is no forest, valley, or desolate place, which Heaven’s clear vision does not see.”43 
Heaven embodies the three aims of government as one objective standard, coinciding with a 
definition of righteousness: 
                                                 
40 Mozi, 12.2, 114. The “Three Dukes” (san gong 三公) are the three most eminent assistants to the Son of Heaven. 
The term is used throughout all Chinese political history (see Hucker 1985, p. 399). 
41 Mozi, 12.3-6, 115-6. 
42 Mozi, 12.7, 117. 
43 Mozi, 26.1, 287. 
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Heaven desires righteousness, and despises unrighteousness. […] When righteousness prevails 
in the world, there is life [that is: population growth], otherwise there is death. When righteous-
ness prevails in the world, there is wealth, otherwise there is poverty. When righteousness pre-
vails in the world, there is order, otherwise there is disorder. Moreover, Heaven desires life and 
despises death, desires wealth and despises poverty, desires order and despises disorder.44 
 
Being the embodiment of Heaven on earth, the Son of Heaven’s authority is only superseded 
by that of Heaven itself: only if his government meets Heaven’s standard of righteousness, his 
rule is legitimate.45 A righteous government (yi zheng 義政) is based on the universal (jian 兼) 
and objective standards set by Heaven. Should his government instead rely on mere physical 
force (li zheng力政), the Son of Heaven would not be worthy of the title “sage king”, but would 
be cast aside by Heaven as a “tyrant” (bao wang 暴王).46 
As Jon Carlson notes, Mozi’s state of nature-argument should best be appreciated in its 
rhetorical function, rather than in a historiographical sense.47 The sage kings are the narrational 
embodiment of how a Heavenly legitimized political order was established in the world, instead 
of a power-structure based on force.48 While focusing on the accounts of the sage kings in the 
Heaven’s Will-chapters, Carlson does not connect them to state of nature-argument in the Es-
teeming Unity-chapters. Although justly dismissing an objective historical reading, Carlson 
thus risks overlooking the causal chain underlying Mozi’s narrative: where did the sage kings 
come from, and how was their power accepted by the people, as well as consolidated? Moreover, 
how did they manage to adjust their conception of righteousness to Heaven’s standard? In ask-
ing these questions, my intention is not to historicize Mozi’s narrative once again, but rather to 
lay bare its conceptual foundations, relating to a surprisingly significant role for violence, sanc-
tioned by Heaven, in establishing and consolidating the sage kings’ political authority. 
Mozi rejects the use of physical force in politics, as the condemnation of aggressive 
warfare is one of the basic features of Heaven’s will.49 However, the establishment of the sage 
                                                 
44 Mozi, 26.3, 288. 
45 Mozi, 27.2, 297. 
46 Mozi, 26.6-7, 289-90. For an excellent account for Heaven’s function as objective standard, as well as its possible 
historical development in Mozi’s philosophy, see Standaert 2013. 
47 Carlson 2014, p. 131. 
48 Ibid., p. 134. Based on an extensive study of ancient texts, Miranda Brown (2013) argues that the Mozi was 
probably the earliest text in Chinese intellectual history to employ the notion of the sage king in this way, that is: 
to make a philosophical statement rather than writing objective history.  
49 Mozi, 27.4, 298. 
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kings’ power is nonetheless the result of a violent intervention, a fact often overlooked in dis-
cussions of Mozi’s account of the origins of political power.50 In this respect, Mozi does not 
form an exception to Mark Lewis’ identification of sanctioned violence as one of the founda-
tional elements of ancient Chinese political theory.51 In his discussion of warfare, Mozi draws 
an important distinction between “aggressive warfare” (gong 攻), denoting larger states seeking 
to conquer smaller ones, and “punitive warfare” (zhu 誅), according to which a violent inter-
vention is justified by Heaven as a means to dethrone tyrants. The latter type of warfare enabled 
the sage kings to establish their power and put an end to the vicious rule of their predecessors.52 
If we understand the utter cosmological chaos under the tyrants’ rule as the world’s relapse into 
the state of nature, we can read Mozi’s defense of punitive warfare in connection with his state 
of nature-argument, providing a mythological justification for the sage kings’ political author-
ity.53  
Thus emerged, out of the state of nature, and through an intervening act of Heavenly 
justified violence, the political world under the Son of Heaven’s rule. Hereafter, a righteous 
government could be installed, in accordance with the three aims of governing as formulated 
by Heaven’s will, to be implemented by a bureaucracy staffed by qualified officials. 
 
3.3 The Free Market of Yi 
 
The political system now established put an end to the contention about the meaning of right-
eousness, but gave in turn rise to a new form of competition: as officials shall be recruited on 
the basis of their skills, ambitious intellectuals will seek to act as righteous as possible, so that 
a rigid “market of talent” emerges, functioning on all levels of the bureaucracy:54 
                                                 
50 For example, Pines (2009, p. 32), remarks that “Mozi’s monarch was established not by means of the violent 
overthrow of his predecessors, but through an ambiguous procedure that looks like a kind of popular election.” 
Fraser (2016, p. 85) emphasizes the possible conventional way in which people came to agree upon their ruler, 
simply appointing the most charismatic leader among them and obeying his orders willingly.  
51 Lewis 1990. In chapter 5, Lewis discusses the legend of the Yellow Emperor slaying the evil genius Chiyou as 
the “charter myth” of political legitimacy in ancient China. Although this myth is from a later date than the Mozi, 
Mozi’s account of the sage kings defeating their opponents may be understood as an older variant of the same 
theme. 
52 Mozi, 19.5-7, 216-7. 
53 Robin Yates (1980, p. 560) interestingly identifies the concerning passage from the Mozi as a political creation 
myth: “The demarcation of boundaries and relationships, geographical, political, religious and social, by naming, 
described as though it was an historical event, was the creation of the Chinese world” (emphasis in the original). 
54 I borrow the phrase “market of talent” form Pines (2013, p. 170), who observes that Mozi’s promotion of po-
tential officials among the society’s intellectuals (shi) is remarkably focused on economic factors, especially when 
compared to Confucius’ emphasis on moral self-cultivation. 
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Therefore, when in ancient times the sage kings were in charge of government, they proclaimed: 
“He who is not righteous shall not be wealthy; he who is not righteousness shall not be noble; 
he who is not righteousness shall not be our kin; he who is not righteousness shall not be near 
us.” Thus, when the wealthiest and noblest people of the state heard this, they all withdrew and 
deliberated: “I used to rely on my wealth and nobility, but now the superiors elevate the right-
eous and no longer exclude the humble and poor, therefore I have to be righteous too.”55 
 
The same deliberation is then made by those who used to rely on kinship or proximity to their 
superiors, until even those who are far removed from the rulers realize that they too have a 
chance of an official career, if only they be righteous enough.  
With everyone forced to compete on a level playing field, leaving all other criteria for 
success worthless, Mozi’s ideal society forms a paragon of social mobility, a free market cen-
tered on the accomplishment of righteousness, where only the most skillful and righteous would 
rise to the top of the bureaucracy. The final arbitrators in this market are again identified as the 
sage kings, who ultimately decide who is to be elevated as “worthy” (xian賢) or to be down-
graded as “unworthy” (bu xiao 不肖): 
 
Therefore, the ancient sage kings highly valued esteeming the worthy and employing the capa-
ble. They did not take sides with their fathers and brothers, did not favor the noble [of birth] and 
rich, or give preference to the good-looking. They promoted and elevated the worthy, enriched 
and ennobled them, and put them in charge of official positions. They downgraded and discarded 
the unworthy, impoverished and debased them, and forced them to do hard labour.56 
 
Additionally, a system of rewards and punishments (shang fa 賞罰) is installed, so that “all 
people are motivated by rewards, and deterred by punishments, persuading each other to be the 
worthiest”.57 Furthermore, Mozi outlines a system of rewarding capable officials, consisting of 
three methods: granting high titles, substantial salaries and effective power in decision-mak-
ing.58 Apart from rewarding those already in position, however, Mozi emphasizes the need for 
rulers to ensure that throughout the entire realm, people will remain ambitious and combative 
                                                 
55 Mozi, 8.4, 66. 
56 Mozi, 9.1, 73. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Mozi, 9.3, 74. 
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to be recognized as qualified officials. For a righteous government to be sustained, competition 
among an increasing number of potential officials must be enhanced, in order to prevent them 
from turning their back on politics altogether: 
 
Suppose, for instance, that one wishes to increase the number of officials (shi) who are capable 
of archery and charioteering. Then one must enrich and ennoble them, respect and praise them, 
after which one will succeed in increasing the number of officials who are capable of archery 
and charioteering. The more so with regard to worthy and qualified officials, strong in virtuous 
behavior, distinctive in their speech and discussions, broadly minded in their ways and methods! 
They are certainly the treasures of the state, the cornerstones of the world. Therefore, one must 
necessarily enrich and ennoble them, respect and praise them, after which one succeeds in in-
creasing the number of worthy and qualified officials.59 
 
In this way, people from all social positions compete with each other to be as righteous as 
possible, with the prospect of being rewarded with an official career, while those already in 
power remain motivated to work as hard as they can, making sure that they are worth their title 
and salary, and take full responsibility for the decisions they make on behalf of their ruler. This 
is how Mozi seeks to establish a new form of aristocracy: an aristocracy of skill, which is meant 
to replace the aristocracy of blood. 
 
3.4 Meritocracy: The Aristocracy of Skill 
 
The concept of “esteeming the worthy” (shang xian) could be characterized as Mozi’s definition 
of meritocracy.60 It is the foundation of government, as the proper estimation of those who are 
worthy of an official career ensures that “the noble and the wise” come to govern the “foolish 
and the base”, where the aristocratic notion of “nobility” is no longer associated with mere 
pedigree, but rather with the exemplary and skillful qualities needed to bring about political 
order: 
 
                                                 
59 Mozi, 8.2, 65. 
60 Somewhat tentatively, “meritocracy” could even be invoked as a translation of shang xian. Mozi himself does 
not systematically develop the idea of meritocracy, so when I speak of “meritocracy”, I implicitly refer to the term 
shang xian. Pines (2013) also conflates the two terms, but argues that throughout later Chinese history, an increas-
ing tension evolved between the notions of xian (“worth”) and gong 功 (“merits”) as the proper foundation for 
meritocratic institutions.   
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How do I know that esteeming the worthy is the foundation of government? I say: there is order 
when the noble and the wise govern the foolish and the base; while there is disorder when the 
foolish and the base govern the noble and the wise. This is how I know that esteeming the worthy 
is the foundation of government.61 
 
Mozi’s formulation of meritocracy thus amounts to a new conception of aristocracy: one of 
skill, rather than blood, and rulers should employ their officials on no other basis than political 
expertise, just like they would in the case of any other task: 
 
When kings, dukes, and high officers have a sheep or an ox, but do not know how to slaughter 
it, they will surely look for a qualified cook; or when they have a piece of cloths, but do not 
know how to weave, they will surely look for a qualified tailor. When it comes to these tasks, 
even though the kings, dukes, and high officers have blood relations, know people who just 
happen to be rich, or are good-looking, but of whom they actually know that they are incapable 
of it, they would not employ them. Why is that? Out of fear for wasting their riches. In these 
cases, the kings, dukes, and high officers do not fail to esteem the worthy and employ the capable.  
When kings, dukes, and high officers have a sick horse, and do not know how to cure 
it, they will surely look for a qualified veterinary; or when they have a swift bow, but do not 
how to draw it, they will surely look for a qualified archer. When it comes to these tasks, even 
though the kings, dukes, and high officers have blood relations, know people who just happen 
to be rich, or are good-looking, but of whom they actually know that they are incapable of it, 
they would not employ them. Why is that? Out of fear for wasting their riches. In these cases, 
the kings, dukes, and high officers do not fail to esteem the worthy and employ the capable.  
But when it comes to the affairs of the state, kings, dukes, and high officers elevate their 
blood relations, those who happen to be rich, or are good-looking. The kings, dukes, and high 
officers thus turn their state into a family matter. Is this any different from turning a swift bow, 
a sick horse, a piece of cloths, or a sheep or ox into a family matter? That is how I know that the 
officials and gentlemen of the world understand small things but do not understand big things. 
It can be compared to employing the mute as a messenger, or the deaf as a musician.62 
 
Mozi thus compares “esteeming the worthy” and “employing the capable” (shi neng 使能) to 
recognizing the capacities of the skilled workingman. This, however, leaves us with an apparent 
                                                 
61 Mozi, 9.1, 73. 
62 Mozi, 10.2, 95. 
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paradox: since someone must always be already there to recognize and employ skilled politi-
cians, he himself cannot be recruited according to these meritocratic principles. As becomes 
manifest from the above-cited passage, the “kings, dukes, and high officers” are already in 
power before they can put the meritocratic principles into practice, but who has employed them 
in the first place, and according to which principle?  
As we have seen, the Son of Heaven, the supreme ruler on top of the political hierarchy, 
is himself only accountable to Heaven, whose objective standards serve as the metaphysical 
foundation for his government. The establishment of the Son of Heaven’s power is ultimately 
based on an act of sanctioned violence. From then on, however, the fate of the Son of Heaven’s 
dynasty depends on the proper adherence to meritocratic rule, while those rulers who fail to 
adhere to it end up without legitimate successors.63 This means that the principle of hereditary 
rule, at least in theory, remains intact, and this is how Mozi reconciles his meritocratic principle 
with a political system that is ultimately aristocratic. 
 When it comes to the sage kings Yao, Shun and Yu, as well as Tang and Wen, the 
respective founders of the Shang and Zhou dynasties, Mozi makes it abundantly clear that they 
appointed their own successors on no other basis than meritocracy, as their successors all started 
out as humble figures from marginal places. Although they did not perpetuate their dynasties 
through hereditary succession, the dynastic principle is not abandoned in these cases, as their 
successors are considered to be the legitimate inheritors (chengsi 承嗣). Putting capable intel-
lectuals in charge of government positions was their secret in perpetuating their dynasties, by 
providing the ruler with capable assistants, ready to inherit the throne in due course: 
  
Therefore, in ancient times, Yao elevated Shun from the sunlit-side of the Fu-marshes, offered 
him the government, and the world was in peace. Yu elevated Yi from the shadowy fields, of-
fered him the government, and the Nine Regions64 were complete. Tang elevated Yi Yin from 
the kitchen, offered him the government, and his plans were established. King Wen elevated 
Hao Yao and Tai Dian from their fishing nets, offered them the government and the western 
plains were subdued.  
 Therefore, in that time, even though granted large salaries and respectable positions, no 
one dared to fulfill his task without reverence and fear. Even though people were farmers or 
common artisans, no one esteemed one’s ambitions without competition and encouragement. 
                                                 
63 Mozi, 9.8, 77. 
64 “The Nine Regions” (jiu zhou 九州) is an alternative name for the Chinese realm, based on a legend according 
to which Yu, having tamed the floods, divided the world into nine administrative regions. 
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That is why intellectuals (shi) are the means to provide the dynastic inheritor with good assis-
tants.65 
 
Thus, Mozi reformulates the aristocratic institutions of his time into a meritocratic sys-
tem based on skill and expert-knowledge. In order to understand what Mozi’s conception of 
this knowledge is, and how it is conceived to be politically relevant, we must now turn to his 
epistemology, providing the philosophical content for Mozi’s ideal bureaucratic institutions. 
  
                                                 
65 Mozi, 8.6, 66-7. Pines observes that Mozi implicitly hints at alternatives to hereditary succession, such as vol-
untary abdication, only in relation to the legendary sage kings. Due to the sensitivity of this theme, Mozi does not 
further elaborate on this idea: “Just as in the case of abdication, a story of (s)electing the supreme leader appears 
in the Mozi in passing, without further elaboration and without an attempt to explicitly relate it to the current 
political situation. The anti-hereditary topoi are present in the Mozi only in nascent form, but these rudimentary 
sentiments testify that the idea of placing the best possible ruler on the throne was not alien to Mozi’s followers” 
(Pines 2009, pp. 60-1). Recently excavated texts have brought to light that the idea of abdication was not uncom-
mon in the Warring States period: see Pines 2005a and Allan 2015. 
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4. The Foundations of Knowledge: Epistemology 
 
According to Mozi, the practical use (yong) of a doctrine or technique is the decisive factor in 
determining its validity. Knowledge, theoretical as well as practical, must be measured in terms 
of benefit (li), which in turn is based on a conception of righteousness (yi). Mozi’s epistemology 
is thereby closely linked to his political program, in which he envisions a bureaucracy staffed 
by meritocratically recruited, qualified officials, equipped with the right knowledge and skills 
for policy-making. However, the criterium of practical use is only one of Mozi’s three standards 
for knowledge, so I will first examine its place within his broader epistemological theory. After 
that, I will differentiate between three practical applications of Mozi’s epistemology: the first 
two are ontological, and play an important role in establishing political authority; the third per-
tains to knowledge of distinctions, and is used to evaluate concepts, as well as to demarcate 
social boundaries.  
 
4.1 The Three Standards for Knowledge: Evidence and Use 
 
Mozi introduces his theory of the three standards for knowledge in the triplet committed to 
denying the existence of fate (Fei ming 非命).66 The most elaborate formula is found in the first 
chapter of the triplet. Mozi first attributes the rulers’ failure to achieve the three aims of gov-
ernment (wealth, population growth, and order) to their false belief in the existence of fate, 
rendering them unmotivated to take matters into their own hands. Hereafter, Mozi proposes to 
investigate the existence of fate, by stating that all speech (yan 言) must be based on proper 
definitions (yi儀), without which it is impossible to know whether a statement relates to reality 
at all. Mozi uses the example of knowing the distinction between day and night. If one speaks 
of this distinction, while defining it by means of a potter’s wheel, instead of a gnomon, one’s 
speech may very well be coherent, but has no relation to reality, and is therefore untrue. The 
more so when it comes to knowing the distinctions between right and wrong, or benefit and 
harm:  
                                                 
66 The Chinese text variously renders the term “standard” as biao 表, “gnomon” (chapter 35) and fa 法, “model” 
(chapters 36 and 37). The contents of the three standards also vary throughout the three chapters, so that Hui-chieh 
Loy (2008, p. 456) argues that we should actually distinguish between five standards. However, I hold, following 
Fraser (2016, p. 65), that these differences merely reflect slight shifts in the vocabulary of different authors, and 
do not convey a significant difference in meaning - the only possible exceptions being the inclusion of the authority 
of ghosts and gods and the documents written by the sage kings in chapter 36. 
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Master Mozi says: “In speaking, one must necessarily establish definitions. To speak without 
definitions is like establishing the difference between day and night on a potter’s wheel. [In this 
manner], it is impossible to know and understand the distinctions between right and wrong or 
benefit and harm. Therefore, speech must have three standards.” 
What is meant by “three standards”? Master Mozi says: “There is its root (ben 本), there 
is its origin (yuan 原), and there is its use (yong 用). How do we determine its root? Above, we 
determine its root through the affairs of the ancient sage kings. How do we determine its origin? 
Below, we determine its origin through investigating the evidence (shi實, “reality”) of the eyes 
and ears of the masses. How do we determine its use? It comes forth from government policy 
and can be seen in the extent to which it brings benefit to the people of the Central States.67 This 
is what I mean by saying that speech must have three standards.”68 
 
The authority of the eyes and ears of the common people is mostly relevant to Mozi’s discussion 
of gods and ghosts. Moreover, the authority of the sage kings and the practical use of a doctrine 
serve in fact an overlapping function, as the sage kings’ affairs are examples of beneficial 
knowledge in action: Yu’s taming of the floods enhanced the well-being of his people, therefore 
his knowledge of hydraulic engineering must surely have been accurate. Practical use thus 
forms a guiding principle in evaluating knowledge, and the sage kings bear testimony to its 
proper use in the past.  
In what follows, I will discuss three political functions of Mozi’s epistemology. First, 
knowledge of the inexistence of fate serves to convince rulers of their own responsibility in 
governing. Secondly, knowledge of the existence of gods and ghosts, acting as intermediates 
between Heaven and earth, serves to prompt the common people to obey authority. Thirdly, 
knowledge of distinctions, most notably between righteous and unrighteous, or right and wrong, 
but also between men and women, and civilized and uncivilized, serves to establish social 
boundaries by means of which political order is sustained. 
 
4.2 The Rulers Are Like Gods: Ontology and Authority 
 
Two of the three above-described functions of Mozi’s epistemology pertain to ontological 
knowledge: the “eyes and ears of the masses”, as well as the acts of the sage kings attest the 
                                                 
67 The term “Central States” (zhong guo 中國) refers to all states within the civilized, Chinese world. 
68 Mozi, 35.3, 394. 
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inexistence of fate. Furthermore, the perception of the common people is invoked to prove the 
existence of gods and ghosts. In fact, the gods, ghosts and sage kings share a similar function: 
by means of their charismatic authority over the people, they give testimony of their supreme 
knowledge of all affairs in the world. The chapter about ghosts is entitled All-perceiving ghosts 
(ming gui 明鬼), which can be related to one of Mozi’s indications for the sage king: the “all-
perceiving ruler” (ming jun 明君), emphasizing his omniscience.69 At one point in Mozi’s state 
of nature-argument, the sage kings are even mistaken by the people for godly figures, as they 
cannot imagine how they could otherwise be so intelligent, capable of rewarding the world’s 
good people, as well as punishing the wicked:  
 
Therefore, if there was a good person as far removed as tens of million miles, and neither his 
family members, nor his fellow villagers knew about it, the Son of Heaven learned of it and 
rewarded him. If there was a wicked person as far removed as tens of million miles, and neither 
his family members, nor his fellow villagers knew about it, the Son of Heaven learned of it and 
punished him. That is why the people in the world were all fearful and awestruck, not daring to 
act wickedly, saying: “The sight and hearing of the Son of Heaven is godlike!” The ancient 
kings said: “It is not godlike, we simply know how to use the people’s eyes and ears to assist us 
in hearing and seeing, the people’s mouths to assist us in speaking, the people’s minds to assist 
us in thinking, and the people’s limbs to assist us in acting.”70 
 
By establishing an information network encompassing all levels of the political hierarchy, com-
pelling all people to report their neighbor’s crimes, while attaching the same punishment to the 
failure of reporting a crime as to the crime itself, the sage kings ensured their omniscience 
regarding all matters in the empire, even though they were initially as human as their inferiors.71 
 In a sense, the people were right in attaching divine attributions to the omniscience of 
their rulers, as this is exactly the role Mozi assigns to the gods and ghosts, after proving their 
existence by means of the common people’s perception, as well as the sage kings’ authority.  
Mozi cites no less than five historical anecdotes of people witnessing ghosts, in addition to four 
scriptural sources, bearing testimony of how the sage kings never ruled on their own, but were 
                                                 
69 The term occurs twice in the Mozi, in 9.3, 74 and 16.7, 174. Note that the term ming gui can also be read with 
ming as a transitive verb: “to clarify ghosts or “to understand ghosts”. I hold that the chapter’s content, explaining 
the ghosts’ function as carriers of information, justifies its translation as “all-perceiving ghosts”, or as Johnston 
less forcefully translates: “percipient ghosts”. 
70 Mozi, 12.11, 118-9. 
71 Mozi, 13.9, 139. 
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always sided by divine figures.72 In the political function the gods and ghosts fulfill, informing 
the ruler of all affairs throughout the empire, we may discern Mozi’s appeal to pragmatism in 
evaluating ontological knowledge:  
 
Therefore, the percipience (ming 明) of the gods and ghosts is such that there could be no remote 
place, vast marsh, mountain, forest, or deep valley, of which they do not know. The punishments 
of the ghosts and gods will necessarily strike all people, no matter how wealthy, noble, manifold, 
strong, brave, martial, or equipped with the deadliest of weapons.73  
 
The gods and ghosts thus form a vital part of Mozi’s meritocratic bureaucracy, sustaining po-
litical order by persuading all people, including government officials, of their all-perceiving 
force: 
 
That is why none of the government officials dared to be corrupt, rewarding all those they wit-
ness being good, punishing all those they witness being wicked. People who were malicious and 
caused disorder through banditry, using weapons, poison, water and fire in taking innocent peo-
ple from the road, stealing their horses and carriages, as well as their clothes in order to benefit 
themselves, were thus being stopped. […] In this way, the entire world was put into order.74  
 
Mozi’s second ontological proof concerns the inexistence of fate (ming 命), thereby 
rejecting the claim that the world is governed by a natural force, leaving human political actors 
without any entitlement to freedom or responsibility. It is no coincidence that Mozi develops 
his epistemological theory in this context, as the false belief in fate is one of the primary causes 
of political failure. If we would believe their appeal to fate, the tyrants of the past cannot be 
held responsible for their malicious behavior. However, when it comes to virtuous statesmen, 
no one would attribute their accomplishments to fate: 
 
                                                 
72 Mozi, 31.4-15, 331-5. See also 31.18, 337, in relation to 19.5-7, 216-7, where the gods figure as communicators 
between Heaven and the sage kings, in sanctioning their punitive war-expeditions against their predecessors.  
 For an interesting reading of the ghosts’ political function in Mozi’s discussion of warfare, see Wong & 
Loy 2004, who conclude from Mozi’s irrational defense of ghosts that his argument could, somewhat cynically, 
be read as an advice to manipulative rulers, who could justify their illicit behavior by appealing to supernatural 
interventions. Although I deem their interpretation to be slightly too Machiavellistic, the ghosts form indeed part 
of Mozi’s functionalist strategy in justifying political authority. In this sense, it is not at all puzzling that Mozi 
does not provide a rational argument for the existence of ghosts, since his ontology is functionalist, not rationalist, 
in the first place. 
73 Mozi, 31.17, 336. 
74 Mozi, 31.16, 336. 
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Now, those who hold that there is such a thing as fate proclaim: “We have not made it up in 
later times [as an excuse for our misbehavior], for such speech has been existing all throughout 
the Three Dynasties,75 and it has been transmitted to us. What do you say to that?” I say: “Do 
you know whether it came from the sagacious and good people of the Three Dynasties, or from 
the tyrannical and unworthy ones? How can we know about that? In the beginning, high officials 
and prominent noblemen were careful in their speech and wise in their conduct, so that above, 
they could admonish and remonstrate their rulers; and below, they could teach the many clans. 
Therefore, from above, they received rewards from their superiors; and from below, they were 
praised by the many clans. The reputation of these high officials and prominent noblemen is still 
heard of and has not vanished, and all the world says: it was due to their own strength.76 
 
If one praises celebrated government officials to have acted by their own strength (li 力), one 
cannot at the same time cover up the misdeeds of tyrants by attributing them to fate. Mozi’s 
contemporary rulers were nevertheless doing so, thus setting the wrong example for their sub-
ordinates, causing the entire empire to tumble down into an apathetic state, with no willingness 
to improve the disordered situation in the world: 
 
Even the poor people of the Three Dynasties were like this: inside, they did not know how to 
serve their family well; outside, they were not able to serve their superiors well. They despised 
arduous work and loved leisure, were fond of eating and drinking and neglected their duties. 
The materials for clothes and food were insufficient, which caused the people to worry about 
starvation and freezing to death. They certainly would not say: “I am simply not worthy; I do 
not rightly fulfill my duties.” So, they simply said: “I am poor, because of fate.”77 
 
We may notice the similarity of this state of affairs with the state of nature, where people equally 
neglected their social duties. Here, Mozi’s denial of the existence of fate also indicates the 
discovery of human freedom and responsibility. With his epistemological prove for the inexist-
ence of fate, Mozi paves the way for a meritocracy, with qualified officials taking full respon-
sibility for their actions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 The Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasties. 
76 Mozi, 36.3, 407. 
77 Mozi, 36.5, 407. 
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4.3 Knowing Distinctions: Gender and Culture 
 
The third political function of Mozi’s epistemology regards the correct knowledge of distinc-
tions (bian 辨). The relation between knowing distinctions and acting correctly in Mozi’s think-
ing is concisely summed up by Fraser: “To know something is to be able to do something cor-
rectly – most fundamentally, to be able to draw distinctions properly.”78 In order to know how 
to apply a certain norm, it is necessary to know how to distinguish between a norm and its 
opposite. Nowhere does Mozi more urgently express this connection between knowledge of 
theoretical dichotomies and their practical application than in his famous denouncement of ag-
gressive warfare: 
 
Suppose there is someone who sees a little bit of black and calls it black, and then sees a large 
amount of black and calls it white, we must conclude from this that he does not know the dis-
tinction between black and white; or someone who tastes a little bit of bitterness and calls it 
bitter, and then tastes a large amount of bitterness and calls it sweet, we must necessarily con-
clude from this that he does not know the distinction between bitter and sweet. Now, on a small 
scale, [the rulers] reject something, and they know how to reject it. But on a large scale, when 
it comes to the rejection of attacking states, they do not know how to reject it, but instead praise 
it and call it righteous. Can this be called knowing the distinction between righteousness and 
unrighteousness? Therefore, we know that the gentlemen of the world are confused in distin-
guishing between righteousness and unrighteousness.79 
 
Paul van Els labels this passage “the moral argument” in Mozi’s rejection of aggressive warfare, 
distinguishing it from the arguments which focus more on economic and religious factors.80 It 
is indeed telling that the most obvious appeal to strictly moral obligations is formulated in such 
concise rationalistic language around the term “distinction”. The standardized conception of 
righteousness is here presented as an objective and knowable entity, which compels the knower 
into immediate policy-making, in this case, refraining from engagement in aggressive warfare.  
                                                 
78 Fraser 2016, p. 57. Fraser (pp. 52-54) focuses his discussion on the terms shi 是 and fei 非, “right” and “wrong”, 
or, as verbs, “approve” and “reject”, which are more sophisticatedly developed in Later Mohist logic, but also play 
an important role in the above-discussed passages on the state of nature-argument, in which people approve of 
their own conception of righteousness and reject that of others. 
79 Mozi, 17.3, 196. Graham (1985, pp. 3-4), suggests that the relatively short chapter 17, from which this passage 
is taken, might have started out as a part of chapter 26, which was later singled out to replace the missing third 
chapter of the Rejecting warfare-triplet. This hypothesis is refuted by Fraser (2010). It is therefore most probably 
a summarizing chapter, written by a later follower of Mozi. See also Van Els 2013, pp. 71-4. 
80 Van Els 2013, pp. 74-8. 
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Apart from the abstract principle of righteousness, however, Mozi’s emphasis on know-
ing and maintaining distinctions manifests itself in various concrete examples within the social 
realm, characteristic of the ideal political order Mozi constantly envisions. The most obvious 
distinction in the political sphere is that between superior and subordinate, or the ruler and his 
officials, but in what follows I will discuss two other social dichotomies which I deem exem-
plary for Mozi’s idea of social order: the proper separation of the sexes, and the dichotomy 
between barbarians and civilized people. 
 
Within the realm of traditional morality, the most apparent distinction Mozi emphasizes on 
numerous occasions is that between men and women. Mozi deems the separation of men and 
women so fundamentally important that he describes it as one of the basic purposes of building 
houses: apart from sheltering from heat and cold, their walls are meant to keep men and women 
apart.81 Likewise characteristically, Mozi mentions the inseparableness of men and women as 
one of the indicators for the level of social chaos prevailing in the empire that marked the jus-
tification for the sage kings to intervene.82 Moreover, the indecent intermingling of men and 
women is discussed as one of the gravest crimes perceived by the gods and ghosts, forcing 
people to strictly abide by the regulations in this regard.83  
The separation of the sexes serves both moral propriety and economic efficiency, and 
these two functions probably evolved simultaneously long before Mozi formulated them as a 
moral prescription. Several times, Mozi assigns the tasks of weaving and spinning to women, 
while men carry out agricultural tasks, or seek a career as government officials.84 The historian 
Yang Kuan identifies Mozi as the earliest Chinese thinker to have turned the much older gender 
distinctions in agricultural occupations into an ideological formula.85 Mozi marks the proper 
regulations for contact between men and women by two opposing phrases: on the one hand, 
there is the separation between men and women (nan nü zhi bie 男女之別),86 while on the other 
hand, the frequent intercourse of men and women (nan nü zhi jiao男女之交) is equally im-
portant, in realizing population growth. For instance, Mozi argues that elaborate funerals and 
mourning rites prevent men and women from seeing each other, so that striving for population 
growth in this manner “could be compared to striving for longevity by letting someone attack 
                                                 
81 Mozi, 21.7, 250-1; 48.13, 691. 
82 Mozi, 19.7, 217. 
83 Mozi, 31.16, 336. 
84 Mozi, 19.4, 216; 25.5, 259; 32.6, 375; 37.7, 418. 
85 Yang 1997/1955, p. 85. See also Hinsch, 2003, pp. 598-600.  
86 In Mozi 35.8, 395, the phrase nan nü zhi bian 男女之辨 is used instead. 
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you with a sword.”87 The political function of separating the sexes is thus outlined in accord-
ance with the three aims of government: by assigning separate economic occupations to the 
appropriate gender roles, wealth is ensured. By enabling men and women to frequently see each 
other, population growth is realized. Finally, by separating them by means of walls inside their 
houses, social order is maintained. 
 
The second social dichotomy I wish to point out is that between civilized and uncivilized peo-
ple.88 When Mozi criticizes rulers for sticking to elaborate funerals without paying intention to 
their waste of resources, he refers to barbarian cultures who equally uphold meaningless and 
abhorrent customs:  
 
In ancient times, there was a country called Kaimu at the east of Yue. When a first son was born 
there, they ripped him apart and ate him, claiming it to be beneficial for his younger brothers. 
When a grandfather died, they expelled the grandmother, saying: “We cannot live in the same 
place with the wife of a ghost.” The superiors took this to be good government, the subordinates 
took this to be proper custom, so they continued this practice without stopping, and carried it 
out without breaking with this tradition. Could this really be called the way of humaneness and 
righteousness? I call it: sticking to one’s habits for convenience’s sake and regarding one’s cus-
toms as righteous.89 
 
Along the same lines, Mozi criticizes the ritual culture of the Zhou dynasty. This is in perfect 
agreement with Mozi’s focus on an objective standard of righteousness, rather than the legacy 
of the early Zhou kings. Pines observes a form of cultural relativism in this respect: “[U]nlike 
Confucians, Mozi did not regard Zhou rites as the criterion for proper behavior. Hence, his 
comparison conveys a sense of relativism: Chinese and aliens’ customs are equally wrong, and 
Chinese have no reason to emphasize their superiority.”90 Indeed, Mozi strongly rebukes a ruler 
who underlines his own culture’s superiority, by haughtily debunking a similar custom of a 
barbarian state: 
 
Lord Yangwen of Lu spoke to Master Mozi: “On the south of Chu exists a country named Qiao 
where cannibals live. When a first son is born in that country, they rip him apart and eat him, 
                                                 
87 Mozi, 25.7, 260. 
88 As Bret Hinsch (2003, p. 606) notes, the two dichotomies are related, as in Chinese intellectual history, the 
neglect of sexual distinctions is often marked as one of the primary characteristics of barbarian cultures  
89 Mozi, 25.14, 263. 
90 Pines 2005b, p. 76. 
31 
 
claiming that it is beneficial for his younger brothers. If the taste is good, they offer it to their 
lord, and when satisfied he rewards the father. Is that not a repulsive custom?”  
Master Mozi replied: “It still does not differ from the customs in our Central States. To 
kill a father and reward his son, is that really not the same as eating a son and rewarding the 
father? If we do not employ humaneness and righteousness, how are we not like the barbarians 
eating their sons?”91 
 
Judging from this passage, I would argue that Mozi’s argument should not be read as a form of 
relativism: on the contrary, he asserts that the prevalent customs of the civilized Chinese world, 
just like those of their barbarous neighbor states, do not live up to the objective standard of 
righteousness. The absolute standard still stands, albeit not in the real world, but in the ideal 
political institutions he envisions. In a political environment in which regicide and patricide are 
all too common, it is in no way salutary, Mozi argues, to set oneself apart from the repulsive 
practices of others.  
In separating barbarians from civilized people, Mozi emphasizes that the entire world 
has degenerated into barbarism, comparable to the time before the establishment of political 
leaders. Mozi thus formulates his ideal political world in opposition to a barbaric state of nature, 
with the objective standard of righteousness, instead of traditional custom, as the guiding prin-
ciple in policy-making.  
 
4.4 Knowing the Future: Technology and Planning 
 
If we now turn back to Gongshu Ban, the engineer to whom Mozi promised to offer the world, 
we can connect Mozi’s political philosophy and epistemology to the symbolic fulfillment of 
this promise. In another dialogue between the two, Mozi criticizes Gongshu’s disregard for 
righteousness in designing naval warfare equipment for the ruler of Chu, who was preparing 
for a river battle between the armies of Chu and Yue. During the battle, Yue employs a defen-
sive strategy by following the current in retreating, instead of in advancing. The natural course 
of the water keeps the soldiers of Yue safe, until Gongshu’s invention enables Chu’s army to 
prevent Yue from retreating by means of a set of hooks and clamps, designed according to 
                                                 
91 Mozi, 49.7, 7.19. 
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standardized measurements. However, Mozi argues, instead of focusing on standardizing vio-
lent technical tools, Gongshu should focus on standardizing righteousness, which apparently is 
done along the same lines as technological engineering: 
 
My righteousness’ hooks and clamps are worthier (xian) than those of your naval warfare equip-
ment. As regards my hooks and clamps: I hook with care (ai 愛), I unite with respect (gong 恭). 
If one does not hook with care, there will be no kinship; if one does not unite with respect, one 
will soon become too intimate. Being intimate without kinship will quickly lead to estrangement.  
Therefore: care for each other, revere each other; this amounts to benefiting each other. 
Now your hooks may obstruct people, but people will also obstruct you. Your clamps may sep-
arate people, but people will also separate themselves from you. Hook each other, clamp each 
other; this amounts to harming each other. Therefore, my righteousness’ hooks and clamps are 
worthier than those of your naval warfare equipment.92 
 
Mozi thus calls for the standardization of the “hooks and clamps” of righteousness: care and 
reverence ensure the regulations for intimate kinship on the one hand, and proper distance on 
the other hand. Through this comparison with standardized weapons, standardization is pre-
sented as a technical skill (qiao), emancipating people from their dependency on environmental 
factors. Government officials, as “political engineers”, must always take righteousness to be 
their guiding line, “just like the carpenter, himself unable to cut in a straight line, must always 
hold on to his cutting line.”93 Knowledge of a straight line, according to Mozi, is just as attain-
able as knowledge of righteous policy. 
Modeled on technological skill, politics becomes an engineering project, enabling the 
ruler to foresee the future, just as the past can be known by examining the documents transmit-
ted by the sage kings. As Mozi aptly explains to a certain Pengqing Shengzi: 
  
Pengqing Shengzi said: “The past can be known; the future cannot be known.” Master Mozi 
said: “Imagine having a relative living a hundred miles away from you, who has suffered a 
calamity. Within the scope of one day, he could make it if you reach him, otherwise he would 
die. Now you have got at your disposal a stable carriage and a well-bred horse, as well as an 
inferior horse and a carriage with four square wheels. If I let you choose one of them, which one 
                                                 
92 Mozi, 49.20, 723-4. For the translation of ai as “care” in Mozi’s philosophy (important for its occurrence in the 
famous phrase jian’ai 兼愛, “universal care”), see Robins (2012), who argues that the common translation of 
“love”, retained by Johnston, does not reflect Mozi’s focus on concrete moral obligations, rather than romantic 
devotion. 
93 Mozi, 47.7, 672. 
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would you ride? “I would ride the stable carriage with the well-bred horse,” he answered. “It 
would allow me to arrive there faster.” “So, then you do know the future!” Master Mozi said.94 
 
Pengqing is able to predict the moment he will reach his family, by relying on the skills 
of his cartwright and horse-breeder. It is not so far-fetched to draw a parallel with Mozi advising 
rulers to rely on the political skills of qualified officials, in accomplishing the three aims of 
government. By focusing on economic efficiency, judging traditions and institutions by their 
merit and sustaining the regulations for men and women, population growth is ensured. By 
installing a meritocratic bureaucracy, recruiting officers on the basis of their qualities, as well 
as establishing an information network by which all misbehaviors throughout the empire can 
be communicated, governmental order is ensured. Finally, by knowing and maintaining clear 
distinctions between right and wrong, righteous and unrighteous, thus refraining from unjusti-
fiably engaging into resource wasting projects of warfare, while making sure that all people 
throughout the empire stick to their allotted tasks and are not distracted, material wealth can be 
achieved.  
  
                                                 
94 Mozi, 49.17, 722. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have attempted to consider Mozi in his role as an advisor for rulers and recruiter 
of government officials. By connecting Mozi’s political philosophy to his epistemology, I have 
argued that Mozi’s envisioned meritocratic bureaucracy can be understood as a synthesis of 
valid knowledge and political power, according to which the notion of “nobility” is reformu-
lated in terms of practical wisdom. The wise men, mythologically embodied by the sage kings, 
receive their authority from their insight into the inexistence of fate and the universal and ob-
jective standards of Heaven. This authority is then given shape by means of a tightly knit hier-
archal system, with carefully allocated administrative and agricultural tasks to men and women, 
whose practices and customs are solely measured by their beneficial qualities. In developing 
this political program, Mozi seeks to convince rulers of the proper means to accomplish material 
wealth, population growth and social order, while at the same time promising unemployed of-
ficials to be able to aspire a political career, regardless of their social background. 
 It should be noted that this paper is thus primarily an exposition, rather than a critical 
evaluation. Mozi’s philosophy has been read in many ways, from an early form of socialism95 
or liberalism96 to a Chinese equivalent of Christianity;97 from a religious program from a sin-
cere concern with the benefit of all people98 to a handbook for manipulative rulers.99 All such 
interpretations could provide useful insights in understanding the Mozi, and it is not my inten-
tion to contribute to any of these debates with this paper, let alone to make a decisive choice 
between these possible readings. Rather than looking into the details of specific doctrines, or to 
speculate about his motivations and intentions, I have attempted to integrate Mozi’s epistemol-
ogy and political philosophy in explaining how Mozi promised to establish political order in 
the world by having wise men govern the foolish, and to pave the way for official careers for 
his most talented disciples, instructing them to take the fundamental notion of righteousness 
into earnest consideration.  
 
  
                                                 
95 David-Néel 1907. 
96 Osborne 2012. 
97 See Malik 2004. 
98 Lowe 1992. 
99 Wong and Loy 2004. 
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